methodatlas
RunsheetDecision Making

Red Teaming

ComplexityHigh
Time1-4 h
Participants3-8
FormatWorkshop
MaturityEstablished
01

Prerequisite

What needs to be finished first

Complete firstConcrete artifactnot in catalog

A strategy, plan, architecture or solution exists in reviewable form so the Red Team can attack concretely.

Without: Without a reviewable artifact, Red Teaming stays generic and produces no attack vectors.
Complete firstPre-Mortem

First risk hypotheses are available so the Red Team can start from real weak points.

Without: Without hypotheses, the Red Team spreads into attacks the original team has already addressed.
02

Preparation

What needs to be ready before start

Materials

Complete documents for the artifact (strategy, architecture, plan); whiteboard or Miro with attack table (attack vector, effect, probability, mitigation); STRIDE/PASTA templates for security if needed.

People / roles

One Red Team (3-5 people), ideally external to the original team; one original-team representative for understanding questions (not defense); one moderator; one scribe.

Pre-read

Provide artifact 2-3 days before workshop; clarify context and assumptions; known attack patterns in domain (security: OWASP; business: competitor moves); time limit for Red Team preparation.

Time needed

1-2 days (1 day preparation, 4-8 h workshop)

Setup

Red Team works autonomously on attack strategies before workshop. Workshop has clear rules: original team does not defend, but listens and notes. Q&A only after complete presentation.

03

Core question

The one question this method answers

Which attack vectors, weaknesses or entry paths overcome the artifact, and which of these vectors are likely enough to justify mitigation?

04

Flow

Marker: Phase

StepDurationActionHint
1Phase 1: Red Team preparation
4-8 hRed Team studies the artifact. Generates attack tree or list. Per attack: vector, required capabilities, effect, probability, existing mitigation.Red Team needs time and distance. Without preparation, Red Teaming becomes discussion round. External people are often more creative than internal ones.
2Phase 2: Context and rules
30 minModerator briefly presents artifact. Red Team and original team ask understanding questions. Rules clear: original team listens, answers facts, does not defend.Defense reflex is the most common method error. Clear rule: discussion only in Phase 4.
3Phase 3: Attack presentation
2-3 hRed Team presents attacks systematically. Per attack: vector, scenario, effect. Original team asks only for understanding, not rebuttal.If original team interrupts and defends, moderator interrupts back. Presentation must be complete before evaluation starts.
4Phase 4: Evaluation and prioritization
90 minPer attack, evaluate effect, probability and mitigation effort. Original team adds context that changes probability. Top attacks go to risk register as risks.Probability is subjective. Consensus is not required, but rationale must be documented.
5Phase 5: Mitigations and follow-ups
60-90 minSketch mitigation per top attack (prevention, detection, response). Owner and deadline. Log changes to artifact.Mitigation must be concrete. "More monitoring" without detail is not mitigation. Owner mandatory.
05

Artifact

What comes out at the end

Form

Red Team report with artifact description, attack list (vector, scenario, effect, probability, mitigation effort), prioritized risks and mitigations with owner and deadline. Supplemented by methodology notes and open questions.

Versioning / ownership

One entry per Red Team session with date and artifact version. Mitigations tracked separately over time. New Red Team run for major changes to artifact.

Tool alternatives
  • Confluence or Notion page with risk register
  • Markdown in repo under docs/security/redteam-reports/
  • Spreadsheet (Sheets, Excel) for attack table
  • Threat-modeling tools such as ThreatDragon or Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool for security red teaming
  • Miro board with attack tree

red-teaming-working-template.md

Compact working template for Red Teaming with challenge scope, attack points, findings, and mitigations.

Red Teaming Working Template

Goal

Challenge assumptions, expose weak spots, and strengthen the plan, strategy, or design.

Context

When and for what do we use this method?

Input

Which data, observations, decisions, or materials are available?

Working area

  • Scope:
  • Attack points:
  • Weak assumptions:
  • Findings:
  • Mitigations:

Output artifacts

  • Challenge notes:
  • Risk register:
  • Mitigation plan:

Open questions

  • ...

Next step

Owner, date, and success signal.

06

Example output

Concrete filled scenario, fictional example

red-teaming-beispiel.md

Concrete filled scenario, fictional example

Red Team Report - Workspot Booking API v2 Architecture, May 2026

Red Team: 3 external architects + 1 internal security champion. Preparation 6 h.

Top attack vectors

A1: Partner load spike through leaked API key

  • Scenario: partner API keys land in public GitHub repo. Bot traffic generates 50,000 requests/min.
  • Effect: Booking API overloaded, p95 breached, extra cost approx. 8,000 EUR/day, reputation damage.
  • Probability: High (several partners are solo self-employed without strict secret hygiene).
  • Mitigation: per-partner rate limit (Owner @ben, by 2026-06-30), token rotation API (Owner @anna, by 2026-07-15), public repo scanner for secrets (Owner @marcus, by 2026-07-30).

A2: Inventory race in multi-region booking

  • Scenario: two bookings for same workspace confirmed simultaneously in different regions.
  • Effect: double booking, customer dispute, manual rollback.
  • Probability: Medium (only arises with active-active multi-region).
  • Mitigation: sticky region per workspace ID instead of tenant (Owner @lisa, adapt ADR-014).

A3: Notification worker as single point of failure

  • Scenario: Kafka consumer hangs, notifications accumulate, confirmation emails delayed.
  • Effect: activation rate drops, support volume rises.
  • Probability: Medium.
  • Mitigation: consumer in 2 replicas + alert at lag >100 (Owner @marcus, by 2026-06-22).

Further attacks (excerpt, without immediate mitigation): cache invalidation bug, compliance audit findings in eu-west region, auth service downtime.

Follow-up: Top 3 into risk register Booking API, ADR-014 adjusted, reviews in 30 days.

07

Pitfalls

Recognize symptoms and steer against them

Trap

Original team defends immediately

Symptom

Presentation becomes discussion, Red Team cannot get through attack list.

What to do

Moderator interrupts. Clear rule: understanding questions yes, defense no. Evaluation only in Phase 4.

Trap

Red Team knows artifact too little

Symptom

Attacks are generic, do not hit artifact.

What to do

Preparation time mandatory. Red Team must have artifact 2-3 days beforehand. If time window is short, postpone.

Trap

Internal Red Teaming

Symptom

Red Team and original team share assumptions, blind spots remain.

What to do

Bring external people into Red Team, ideally with different perspective. If impossible, at least another department.

Trap

Attacks without mitigation

Symptom

Long attack list, nobody takes mitigation ownership, list gathers dust.

What to do

Top attacks require mitigation, owner, deadline. Other attacks as watchlist with next review date.

Trap

Politics instead of method

Symptom

Red Team is used to fight internal conflicts, attacks are hidden career moves.

What to do

Independent moderator. Attacks relate to artifact, not people. Moderator interrupts personalization.

08

Stop criteria

Done signals checkable in under a minute

Artifact is not stable or not completely documented.
Red Team could not prepare, workshop becomes discussion.
Original team does not accept method, defense mode dominates.
External Red Team unavailable and internal distance impossible.
Mandate for mitigations missing, risks remain documented without consequence.
Political environment enforces glossing over, method is undermined.

Finished the runsheet?

Go to the profile for purpose, similar methods, and sources or continue to the next method in the catalog.