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Selected:Failure Mode and Effects AnalysisBarrier AnalysisLASR (Lightweight Approach for Software Reviews)Fault Tree Analysis
| Criterion | ![]() Operations Failure Mode and Effects Analysis | ![]() Operations Barrier Analysis | ![]() Architecture LASR (Lightweight Approach for Software Reviews) | ![]() Operations Fault Tree Analysis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Purposedifferent | For a process, product, or service with noticeable failure risks, the method assesses possible failure modes in advance. It directs attention to combinations of occurrence, effect, and detectability. | For a risk that can only be managed through multiple layers of protection, the method examines the effectiveness of each barrier. It shows where safeguards are missing, too weak, or fail under real conditions. | LASR helps development teams identify where their software falls short of important quality goals and which improvements to consider. A small group with existing system knowledge can make an initial assessment and investigate open questions in more detail. | For a critical top event with several possible triggers, the method logically models failure paths. It makes visible which combinations of conditions can lead to damage. |
Complexitydifferent | High | Medium | Medium | High |
Timedifferent | 2-6 h | 2-4 h | 3–4 h for initial assessment; preparation and deeper analysis additional | 2-6 h |
Participantsdifferent | 3-10 | 2-6 | 1 or a small team; particularly suitable for 3–4 people | 3-8 |
Formatdifferent | Workshop | Workshop + async | Workshop + async | Workshop + async |
Outputdifferent | FMEA Table, Risk Priority, Mitigation Actions | Barrier Inventory, Failure Analysis per Barrier, Action Backlog | Lean Mission Statement describing the software’s purpose, Prioritized quality goals and evaluation criteria, Risks and estimated gaps against quality goals, More closely examined findings and open checks | Fault Tree, Critical Paths, Cause Hypotheses, Control Actions |
Tagsno overlap | RiskQualityOperationsRoot cause | Root causeSafetyIncident | ArchitectureQualityRiskAssessmentLean | RiskRoot causeSafety |



